Philippians 3.8 is one of my favorite verses in all of the Bible - "What is more, I consider everything a loss compared to the surpassing greatness of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord, for whose sake I have lost all things. I consider them rubbish, that I may gain Christ..." In this context Paul is arguing that he, like the "dogs" mentioned in v. 2, has an impeccable Jewish background, both in things that he was born into and things that he himself achieved. However, all that was to his profit, i.e., his Jewish background, he now considers loss (v. 7). Then he widens the scope in v. 8 to include "everything" under this category of "loss." Why? Because in comparison with knowing Christ Jesus as his Lord everything in Paul's world was rubbish, skubala, which is perhaps better translated as "crap" or even a more crass word (v. 8).
This verse (actually this entire passage - Phil 3.2-11) is central to understanding many things about Paul, at least as far as we are able. These verses shed light on Paul's back story, his post-Christ understanding of his pre-Christ self, his thoughts on how knowing Christ changed him, and what he believes the goals of his life in Christ are. These are all highly important things to keep in mind when attempting to articulate anything about Paul's theology. Perhaps the most influential one is that knowing Christ changed everything for Paul.
It should be noted and noted well that Paul does not claim in this passage that he was unhappy with his pre-Christ life when he was living it. Paul was not some sort of troubled soul prior to experiencing Christ, who found an answer in Christ to life's problems and was given psychological solice from his guilt-ridden existence (this point was famously made by Krister Stendahl in "The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West"). Instead Paul was happy expressing his love for God the way that he was taught, in the traditions of his fathers (Gal 1.14).
Then Christ was revealed to him (Gal 1.16), which relativized Paul's entire existence. Nothing that had seemed important before had the same weight anymore. What had been the center of Paul's life, the Law, now had its role usurped, replaced by Jesus Christ his Lord. It is my further contention that Paul's subsequent view of the Law and its place completely changed because of his encounter with Christ. Though Paul thought that the Law was still good, useful, and spiritual (Rom 7.12, 14), it now served a new purpose - to point people to the new reality that has been opened by Christ Jesus (Gal 3.24). Furthermore, the Law has not been superseded or nullified; not at all! It is fulfilled in those who believe (Rom 3.31), presumably through the power of the Spirit (Rom 8.4).
For Paul the Law's role and purpose was relavitized by Christ. Therefore, all of Paul's statements about the Law should always be read keeping this relatvitizing power of Christ in mind. Paul does not seem to have a problem with the Law per se, he seems to have a problem with people, even Christ-followers, who want to place it along side Christ at the center. If rightness with God could be attained in anyway outside of Christ, then Jesus' death was in vain (Gal 2.21). Thus, even though the religion that Paul practiced pre-Christ had a healthy dose of grace (cf. Sanders' covental nomism), compared to knowing Jesus it all took on new meaning (Phil 3.8).
I won't pretend that these thoughts are entirely original or that they will settle the debate on this issue. However, I do believe that Phil 3 should elicit much more attention than it actually receives. Perhaps the key that unlocks the Paul-and-the-Law safe is found there, namely the relavitizing power of Christ.
Showing posts with label law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label law. Show all posts
Thursday, June 05, 2008
Sunday, December 30, 2007
Hagner on Nanos on Hagner
My friend Pat McCullough indicated in the comments of a previous post that he wished that I would get beyond the polemic in Mark Nanos' critique of Hagner's Chapter in Jewish Believers in Jesus. This is something that I want to do, but I will have to leave it aside for another time.
The reason for this is that Pat has brought it to my attention, via a very helpful post on his blog, that Nanos' critique and Hagner's response at SBL were recorded and made available online for free at TorahResource.com (right-click and save "Part 2"). Thus, I find it quite appropriate to allow Hagner to speak for himself (as Pat has done on his own blog) before delving into this any deeper.
Before I do that, however, I feel compelled to highlight some things that Nanos did not vocalize at SBL that he did in his written critique. Two which caused me the greatest alarm were left out by Nanos completely: his attack of Hagner's usage of definitive language (e.g., "clearly") and his demeaning comparison of Hagner to his own students. My primary problem, however, with Nanos' critique in my previous post was that he did not seem to read or fully understand Hagner's third footnote, in which Hagner explicitly explains his usage of the terms "Judaism" and "Christianity."
Putting these observations to one side, let us now read a transcript of Hagner's response to Nanos' critique (helpfully provided by Pat):
Hagner highlights some important things in his response. He emphasizes his position that Paul was both a Jew and a Christian (as defined in f.n. 3!). Hagner points out very clearly that Nanos is guilty of pushing Paul into (full) continuity with first-century Judaism when the texts (Gal 1.13; Phil 3.4) point a different direction. Lastly, Hagner reaffirms that in his opinion Paul does not believe that believers in Jesus are "under the Law," which nevertheless does not eradicate the pursuit of righteousness by these same believers.
In my next post on this topic I hope to deal in more depth with three issues: 1) Hagner's language about his past and present that Nanos claims is contradictory; 2) Nanos' highly idiosyncratic reading of Phil 3.4-7; and 3) The value of using "Christian" to describe the religious experience of Paul or his ideas. While attempting to understand these three issues will not put this debate to rest, I do believe that doing so will bring the discontinuity between Hagner and Nanos into even sharper focus (as if that were necessary!).
Paul as a Jewish Believer
Nanos on Hagner
The reason for this is that Pat has brought it to my attention, via a very helpful post on his blog, that Nanos' critique and Hagner's response at SBL were recorded and made available online for free at TorahResource.com (right-click and save "Part 2"). Thus, I find it quite appropriate to allow Hagner to speak for himself (as Pat has done on his own blog) before delving into this any deeper.
Before I do that, however, I feel compelled to highlight some things that Nanos did not vocalize at SBL that he did in his written critique. Two which caused me the greatest alarm were left out by Nanos completely: his attack of Hagner's usage of definitive language (e.g., "clearly") and his demeaning comparison of Hagner to his own students. My primary problem, however, with Nanos' critique in my previous post was that he did not seem to read or fully understand Hagner's third footnote, in which Hagner explicitly explains his usage of the terms "Judaism" and "Christianity."
Putting these observations to one side, let us now read a transcript of Hagner's response to Nanos' critique (helpfully provided by Pat):
I thank the chair for the privilege of having a few minutes to respond even though I'm not on the program. My good friend, Mark–my former good friend, Mark [laughter], is as usual always interesting, always stimulating, but, at least for me, not always persuasive. He accuses me of prejudging the issues and I have to say that I think Mark has at least as much of an a priori as I have. And I think he has more of an a priori than I have, if that's okay. Mark tends to dismiss my view as the "traditional view." I'd like to say that because an interpretation is "traditional" does not mean it is necessarily true, but it also does not mean it is necessarily false. I think it's interesting to ponder the fact that so many have understood Paul in the traditional way. It doesn't mean it's right; it’s just an interesting observation.
Next, I'd like to say that the challenge for both of us is to make some coherent sense not just of a few texts, but of all of the texts… together. And I think that leads us to the necessity of affirming tensions, nuances, subtleties, things that you tend to refer to as "contradictions," I'm afraid. It's also not a matter of either/or; it's a matter of both/and. It’s not whether Paul is a Jew or a Christian. He is both: a Jew and a Christian. But these subtleties, I think, sometimes seem to escape Mark. Somehow Mark has missed my affirmation that Paul is a Jew… that Paul is a Jewish believer in Jesus, that Paul has not changed his religion, that Paul upholds the righteousness of the law, but with a new dynamic, in a new way. I emphatically deny something that he has in his written statement, namely (this is a quote from him), he says that I think Paul "is engaged in a new religion that stands against his former religion" [pg 15]. No, no, no! I do not think that. Not at all. It's the absolute opposite of what I think, in fact. Paul is affirming the true Judaism in his own mind.
Mark wants to push me into a simple "discontinuity" between Paul and Judaism in contrast to his simple "continuity." But again, the issue is not that easy. We have to deal with both/and, both continuity and discontinuity in this matter. Mark's view is just a little too simplistic for me. Galatians 1:13, Paul speaks of his Ἰουδαϊσμός as something of the past and I don't think I can read it in the way Mark does, just moving from one form of Judaism to another. The Ἰουδαϊσμός is behind him, I think. And his Philippians 3:4 and following, Paul counts his Jewish pedigree, including his blamelessness as a Pharisee as worthless. What matters is Χριστὸς.And it's ludicrous, by the way, I think, Mark, to say that he would have to include his apostleship in that list [see pg 8]. That's not giving him a fair chance to say what he means to say, what he wants to say. Because Paul doesn't use the word "Christian" does not mean that he can't be described or shouldn't be described as a Christian. I fail to see how Mark can deny my two non-negotiables. Are these two statements really questionable on a reading of the authentic Pauline letters? First, that Christians are no longer under the law. Second, that righteousness remains for Paul an indispensable priority. Can we really challenge either of those statements on the basis of the Pauline letters? I don't think so. Mark's Paul, for me, is not the Paul of the letters. I would ask him to make better sense of the texts than I have. And I think so far, he hasn't. Thank you.
Hagner highlights some important things in his response. He emphasizes his position that Paul was both a Jew and a Christian (as defined in f.n. 3!). Hagner points out very clearly that Nanos is guilty of pushing Paul into (full) continuity with first-century Judaism when the texts (Gal 1.13; Phil 3.4) point a different direction. Lastly, Hagner reaffirms that in his opinion Paul does not believe that believers in Jesus are "under the Law," which nevertheless does not eradicate the pursuit of righteousness by these same believers.
In my next post on this topic I hope to deal in more depth with three issues: 1) Hagner's language about his past and present that Nanos claims is contradictory; 2) Nanos' highly idiosyncratic reading of Phil 3.4-7; and 3) The value of using "Christian" to describe the religious experience of Paul or his ideas. While attempting to understand these three issues will not put this debate to rest, I do believe that doing so will bring the discontinuity between Hagner and Nanos into even sharper focus (as if that were necessary!).
Paul as a Jewish Believer
Nanos on Hagner
Thursday, December 20, 2007
Nanos on Hagner
Mark Nanos prepared a paper entitled "Have Paul and His Communities Left Judaism for Christianity?" A Review of the Paul-Related Chapters in Jewish Believers in Jesus and Jewish Christianity Revisited" for an SBL session called "Jewish Christianity Consultation," which took place on November 19, 2007. I will only interact with the section in which he critiques the work of Donald Hagner (3-16). If you would like to view the entire document, it is available at his website in pdf format.
I have re-written this sentence several times because I cannot, for the life, of me decide where to begin. I guess I'll start by giving my overall impression of Nanos' critique. First, the tone in the paper is highly polemical, and that is putting it nicely. At every turn he fails to give Hagner the benefit of the doubt and when Nanos finally does attempt to read Hagner faithfully, he resorts to saying that Hagner is reading his own ideology into the text (e.g., "Hagner's Saul turned into Hagner's Paul" [4]). Second, Nanos appears to have a basic misunderstanding of Hagner's choice of terminology regarding Judaism and Christianity (we will explore this in more detail below). And third, Nanos strikes a low blow toward the end of his critique by implying that what Hagner cannot do he (Nanos) requires of his students (15-16).
Now before I continue I should be completely honest for the sake of full disclosure. First, I am a proponent, generally, of the traditional perspective on Paul. While my understanding of Judaism on the whole may be influenced by Sanders, his research (and that of others) has not convinced me to abandon what appears to be the plain meaning of Paul's letters. Second, Dr. Hagner is my mentor at Fuller; thus, my opinion of Nanos' attack on his essay will be, obviously, biased. Those two disclaimers aside, I will try to offer an honest assessment of Nanos' paper.
Beginning with the unnecessary polemic. If this paper felt as pointed as it did when I read it, I can only imagine how it must have sounded as Nanos read it with Hagner sitting in the room. I am reminded of the impression I was left with after the pistis christou session on the Friday of SBL; why is civility so hard to come by these days? Here's a good example of what I am talking about: when is it ever appropriate to assume you have access to the private thoughts and motivations of others? Nanos writes:
Not only has Nanos attempted to think Hagner's thoughts after him, he has accused him of eisegesis! Nanos might as well call Karl Barth a Pelagian or Stevie Ray Vaughan a hack! Nanos continues: "this essay is not so much an historical as an ideological exercise" (4). I find this to be amazing. I am tempted to assume why Nanos felt compelled to characterize Hagner in this manner, but to do so would not be civil.
Perhaps a little fairness could have helped Nanos' critique come across much better. For example, he chastises Hagner's use of "clear(ly) and obvious(ly)" (5), while a quick word search in the pdf reveals that Nanos uses this same sort of terminology himself ("certainly not" [8-9]; Nanos claims that "Hagner's arguments continue to make clear" the presumption that "Christ-believing Judaism" is a new religion [7]; "it is clear" that offering a counter-reading to Hagner is pointless [11]; and the list grows longer if you consider the material not dealing with Hagner in the paper)! I wonder how many usages of "certainly," "clearly," and the like one would find in other works by Nanos? Also, since when has using confident language as a rhetorical device not been utilized? If Nanos has a problem with this in general then he should have stated his case generally, but since he has a problem with Hagner using this sort of language, perhaps he should have avoided it himself!
Other examples of the unnecessary polemics in this paper could be given but I must move on to Nanos' largest misunderstanding of Hagner which colors the entire paper. A quote from the last paragraph of the section critiquing Hagner will illustrate this beautifully:
I find this fascinating. Hagner explains his usage of the anachronistic terms "Christianity" and "Judaism" in the third footnote of his essay:
Thus, it appears that Nanos makes a false assumption about Hagner's usage of this terminology. By "Judaism" Hagner does not have in mind rabbinic Judaism and by "Christianity" Hagner does not have in mind the more organized and separated Church of the second century and beyond. Instead, it appears to me that Hagner uses the terms to discuss Paul's pre-Christ religious experience and thought, "Judaism," and his post-Christ religious experience and thought, "Christianity." Had Hagner not clearly stated what he meant by these terms, then Nanos' misunderstanding would have been valid and his critique would have hit home with me. However, since Hagner did explain his usage, Nanos' critique comes across as stretching for anything about which to complain.
Perhaps behind both scholars on this point is their understanding of Paul's conversion/call. Using the terms highlights the discontinuity between Paul's past and present, while not using them (or using "Judaisms" instead) highlights the continuity. However, unfairly assuming that Hagner meant something that he clearly did not and then basing most of his critiques against the essay on this assumption was simply bad methodology on Nanos' part.
Lastly, in a moment that was at least underhanded and at most holier-than-thou, Nanos writes the following:
Wow. Nanos overtly states here that Hagner does what he does not allow his students to do! Again, had Nanos had a problem with Hagner's usage of this language perhaps he should have read footnote three more closely! Even if Hagner had not included the footnote, comparing an established scholar who is internationally respected to one's students is both uncalled for and insulting.
There is so much more that I could say in regard to Nanos' paper, and perhaps I will when I return from Christmas vacation, but for now this will have to do.
Paul as a Jewish Believer
Hagner on Nanos on Hagner
I have re-written this sentence several times because I cannot, for the life, of me decide where to begin. I guess I'll start by giving my overall impression of Nanos' critique. First, the tone in the paper is highly polemical, and that is putting it nicely. At every turn he fails to give Hagner the benefit of the doubt and when Nanos finally does attempt to read Hagner faithfully, he resorts to saying that Hagner is reading his own ideology into the text (e.g., "Hagner's Saul turned into Hagner's Paul" [4]). Second, Nanos appears to have a basic misunderstanding of Hagner's choice of terminology regarding Judaism and Christianity (we will explore this in more detail below). And third, Nanos strikes a low blow toward the end of his critique by implying that what Hagner cannot do he (Nanos) requires of his students (15-16).
Now before I continue I should be completely honest for the sake of full disclosure. First, I am a proponent, generally, of the traditional perspective on Paul. While my understanding of Judaism on the whole may be influenced by Sanders, his research (and that of others) has not convinced me to abandon what appears to be the plain meaning of Paul's letters. Second, Dr. Hagner is my mentor at Fuller; thus, my opinion of Nanos' attack on his essay will be, obviously, biased. Those two disclaimers aside, I will try to offer an honest assessment of Nanos' paper.
Beginning with the unnecessary polemic. If this paper felt as pointed as it did when I read it, I can only imagine how it must have sounded as Nanos read it with Hagner sitting in the room. I am reminded of the impression I was left with after the pistis christou session on the Friday of SBL; why is civility so hard to come by these days? Here's a good example of what I am talking about: when is it ever appropriate to assume you have access to the private thoughts and motivations of others? Nanos writes:
I submit that the frame for viewing Paul is already constrained to viewing him only from the perspective, concerns, and answers of a later time, and that the essay has been written to confirm the views of those who already share Hagner's point of view on Paul. (4)
Not only has Nanos attempted to think Hagner's thoughts after him, he has accused him of eisegesis! Nanos might as well call Karl Barth a Pelagian or Stevie Ray Vaughan a hack! Nanos continues: "this essay is not so much an historical as an ideological exercise" (4). I find this to be amazing. I am tempted to assume why Nanos felt compelled to characterize Hagner in this manner, but to do so would not be civil.
Perhaps a little fairness could have helped Nanos' critique come across much better. For example, he chastises Hagner's use of "clear(ly) and obvious(ly)" (5), while a quick word search in the pdf reveals that Nanos uses this same sort of terminology himself ("certainly not" [8-9]; Nanos claims that "Hagner's arguments continue to make clear" the presumption that "Christ-believing Judaism" is a new religion [7]; "it is clear" that offering a counter-reading to Hagner is pointless [11]; and the list grows longer if you consider the material not dealing with Hagner in the paper)! I wonder how many usages of "certainly," "clearly," and the like one would find in other works by Nanos? Also, since when has using confident language as a rhetorical device not been utilized? If Nanos has a problem with this in general then he should have stated his case generally, but since he has a problem with Hagner using this sort of language, perhaps he should have avoided it himself!
Other examples of the unnecessary polemics in this paper could be given but I must move on to Nanos' largest misunderstanding of Hagner which colors the entire paper. A quote from the last paragraph of the section critiquing Hagner will illustrate this beautifully:
While Paul got by without using the term Christian, Hagner does not do so. He probably should not. Based on what Hagner communicates about Paul, it would not be useful to avoid such terminology, or deny that his Paul has moved from one religion to another. (16)
I find this fascinating. Hagner explains his usage of the anachronistic terms "Christianity" and "Judaism" in the third footnote of his essay:
The use of the terms "Judaism" and "Christianity" in reference to the first century is nowadays regarded as problematic. Neither term means what it will come to mean in the centuries following the time of Paul. Judaism is in a highly formative stage in the first two centuries (especially before the destruction of Jerusalem in 70). Similarly, first-century Christianity is not what it will become in the second century. But this terminological debate anticipates the discussion that follows. We will continue to use the terms for the sake of convenience. (n.3 97)
Thus, it appears that Nanos makes a false assumption about Hagner's usage of this terminology. By "Judaism" Hagner does not have in mind rabbinic Judaism and by "Christianity" Hagner does not have in mind the more organized and separated Church of the second century and beyond. Instead, it appears to me that Hagner uses the terms to discuss Paul's pre-Christ religious experience and thought, "Judaism," and his post-Christ religious experience and thought, "Christianity." Had Hagner not clearly stated what he meant by these terms, then Nanos' misunderstanding would have been valid and his critique would have hit home with me. However, since Hagner did explain his usage, Nanos' critique comes across as stretching for anything about which to complain.
Perhaps behind both scholars on this point is their understanding of Paul's conversion/call. Using the terms highlights the discontinuity between Paul's past and present, while not using them (or using "Judaisms" instead) highlights the continuity. However, unfairly assuming that Hagner meant something that he clearly did not and then basing most of his critiques against the essay on this assumption was simply bad methodology on Nanos' part.
Lastly, in a moment that was at least underhanded and at most holier-than-thou, Nanos writes the following:
This essay exemplifies why I do not permit my students to use the terms Christian or Christianity when discussing Paul and his communities: much more than terminology is at issue; rather, it is the way that terminology reveals and limits our conceptualization of reality. Regardless of any new information that will be introduced to them, the way that they have learned from childhood to perceive and thus describe the world into which to fit this new information will inhibit them from thinking about these new things in new ways, including ways that just might challenge and alter what they think they know to be absolute, un-interpreted, non-negotiable truth, instead of being merely one among the many interpretations available for conceptualizing the meaning of this information. In my view, we should seek to limit neither the answers, nor the questions to be posed. As important as terminology is, it is less important than how it either limits or advances the ability to conceptualize and describe the maps upon which we plot the information at issue.
Wow. Nanos overtly states here that Hagner does what he does not allow his students to do! Again, had Nanos had a problem with Hagner's usage of this language perhaps he should have read footnote three more closely! Even if Hagner had not included the footnote, comparing an established scholar who is internationally respected to one's students is both uncalled for and insulting.
There is so much more that I could say in regard to Nanos' paper, and perhaps I will when I return from Christmas vacation, but for now this will have to do.
Paul as a Jewish Believer
Hagner on Nanos on Hagner
Paul as a Jewish Believer
I finished reading Donald Hagner's article in Jewish Believers in Jesus: The Early Centuries ("Paul as a Jewish Believer--According to His Letters" [96-120]) and I thought that I would share a summary and analysis of it here. Sometime soon, hopefully later today, I'll post my thoughts about Mark Nanos' slashing critique of Hagner's essay that was presented at this year's SBL.
To begin with, it would be good to underscore Hagner's methodology in this essay. Basically what he is doing is trying to uncover the continuity or discontinuity that Paul's post-Christ religious experience has with regard to his Jewish past. In order to do this Hagner utilizes material almost exclusively from Paul's undisputed letters (he does include a few references to the disputed letters both parenthetically and in footnotes). Also, Hagner pays careful attention to the scholarship regarding this issue, both the writings from Jewish and gentile scholars.
The thesis of the essay appears to be that while there is much continuity between Paul's pre-Christ Judaism and his post-Christ religious experience, there is also much discontuity; and the latter should not be ignored because of the former.
In the first section ("The Changing Understanding of Paul"), Hagner gives a nice overview of scholarship on the Jewishness of Paul, paying special and close attention to Jewish works, the Hellenistic Judaism/Palestinian Judaism distinction, and the New Perspective on Paul. His grasp of the development of this issue is impressive, both in its breadth and depth.
The second section ("Studies in Continuity and Discontinuity"), which comprises the bulk of the essay, is a detailed examination of the connectedness of Paul's thought and experience had with first-century Judaism. In most instances Hagner assumes the traditional interpretations while nuancing them when needed as a result of new findings or historical developments. For example, Hagner argues that Paul was not merely called to be a missionary to the gentiles, but that Paul's post-Christ experience "involves a dramatic enough shift that conversion is also an appropriate word" (102). He does not summarily dismiss the notion of Paul's call with regard to his conversion, he simply qualifies it.
Hagner continues in this section by arguing that Paul's soteriology has changed (102-114). Perhaps the best passage in the entire essay is found in sub-section 2.2.1, "Paul and the law," where Hagner highlights the fact that Paul can make both negative and positive statements concerning the law. Hagner's conclusion regarding this seeming problem is fascinating: "If we take the negative statements regarding the law as referring to the commandments, it is possible to take the positive statements as referring simply to the righteousness that is the goal of the law" (108). In other words, according to Hagner, Paul can speak of believers in Christ not being under the law, while the original intent of the law, righteousness, is spoken of positively.
This may lead one to think that Paul (and Hagner!) thinks that right living is no longer that important for the believer in Christ. Hagner argues exactly the opposite in sub-section 2.2.3, "The ongoing importance of righteousness for Paul." Hagner encapsulates his position well in the following sentence: "The paradox can be summed up by saying that those who are free from the law are now in a position to, and called to, pursue a righteousness that remarkably corresponds to the goal of the law" (111). In so doing, Hagner preserves for Paul freedom from the law, as is certainly espoused in his letters, while also accentuating Paul's clear concern for ethical living.
The third and final section ("Old and New in Paul") is the conclusion to the essay. In it Hagner states the following:
These two sentences describe Hagner's basic position quite well -- while there is "old" present in Paul, the "new" is so important that something different is created that is colored by what came before, not vice versa.
As already mentioned, Hagner presents his readers with traditional understandings of Paul in this essay. However, he does not do so without regard to new developments in the study of Paul and Judaism or the repugnant history of violence against Jews, especially in the twentieth century. As important as these two things are (and they are very important indeed!), Hagner does not allow them to control his reading of Paul. Instead, he attempts to read Paul faithfully while softening some of previous scholarship's rough edges where needed. In my estimation, Hagner's essay is convincing and even-handed.
I was left wanting in a specific area; I wish there had been more interaction with the texts of Second-Temple Judaism. Hagner is not to blame here, however, since this sort of essay cannot possibly cover all the bases. There are several places where the reader is left wanting to actually read what Jews of this period thought about these various issues. But again, this perceived deficiency in Hagner's essay has more to do with its scope than with its actual content, as the subtitle of the essay makes clear -- "According to Paul's Letters." In almost every instance of this phenomenon, however, the reader is pointed to more complete treatments of the issues in other works by Hagner or others. Thus, while every "i" could not be dotted and "t" crossed in this one essay, Hagner responsibly gives the reader ample opportunity to discover more on his/her own.
In my opinion, the greatest strength of Hagner's essay is the large amount of material quoted from Paul's letters themselves. Perhaps this is not necessarily a strength of Hagner's essay but of the traditional reading of Paul in general. In the work of a New Perspectivist, there are often many terms and phrases which are not taken to mean what they plainly seem to mean (e.g., "my own righteousness" in Phil 3.9 not pointing to a righteousness that Paul at least had a part in obtaining, but instead to some sort of national righteousness). Thus, when one is reading Dunn, Wright, etc and has the New Testament in hand, it is often difficult to see how they have arrived at the positions for which they argue so strongly. In Hagner's essay, however, Paul is often allowed to speak in his own voice and his words are allowed to carry what appear to be their plain meanings.
Nanos on Hagner
Hagner on Nanos on Hagner
To begin with, it would be good to underscore Hagner's methodology in this essay. Basically what he is doing is trying to uncover the continuity or discontinuity that Paul's post-Christ religious experience has with regard to his Jewish past. In order to do this Hagner utilizes material almost exclusively from Paul's undisputed letters (he does include a few references to the disputed letters both parenthetically and in footnotes). Also, Hagner pays careful attention to the scholarship regarding this issue, both the writings from Jewish and gentile scholars.
The thesis of the essay appears to be that while there is much continuity between Paul's pre-Christ Judaism and his post-Christ religious experience, there is also much discontuity; and the latter should not be ignored because of the former.
In the first section ("The Changing Understanding of Paul"), Hagner gives a nice overview of scholarship on the Jewishness of Paul, paying special and close attention to Jewish works, the Hellenistic Judaism/Palestinian Judaism distinction, and the New Perspective on Paul. His grasp of the development of this issue is impressive, both in its breadth and depth.
The second section ("Studies in Continuity and Discontinuity"), which comprises the bulk of the essay, is a detailed examination of the connectedness of Paul's thought and experience had with first-century Judaism. In most instances Hagner assumes the traditional interpretations while nuancing them when needed as a result of new findings or historical developments. For example, Hagner argues that Paul was not merely called to be a missionary to the gentiles, but that Paul's post-Christ experience "involves a dramatic enough shift that conversion is also an appropriate word" (102). He does not summarily dismiss the notion of Paul's call with regard to his conversion, he simply qualifies it.
Hagner continues in this section by arguing that Paul's soteriology has changed (102-114). Perhaps the best passage in the entire essay is found in sub-section 2.2.1, "Paul and the law," where Hagner highlights the fact that Paul can make both negative and positive statements concerning the law. Hagner's conclusion regarding this seeming problem is fascinating: "If we take the negative statements regarding the law as referring to the commandments, it is possible to take the positive statements as referring simply to the righteousness that is the goal of the law" (108). In other words, according to Hagner, Paul can speak of believers in Christ not being under the law, while the original intent of the law, righteousness, is spoken of positively.
This may lead one to think that Paul (and Hagner!) thinks that right living is no longer that important for the believer in Christ. Hagner argues exactly the opposite in sub-section 2.2.3, "The ongoing importance of righteousness for Paul." Hagner encapsulates his position well in the following sentence: "The paradox can be summed up by saying that those who are free from the law are now in a position to, and called to, pursue a righteousness that remarkably corresponds to the goal of the law" (111). In so doing, Hagner preserves for Paul freedom from the law, as is certainly espoused in his letters, while also accentuating Paul's clear concern for ethical living.
The third and final section ("Old and New in Paul") is the conclusion to the essay. In it Hagner states the following:
Furthermore, the old and the new are not present in an equal balance. We do not have a situation in which a variety of new perspectives are added to the staple of old things that constitute Judaism, causing only minor readjustments. On the contrary, the new that comes is an eschatological turning point in the ages, of such great consequence that we must be prepared for dramatic shifts. (118)
These two sentences describe Hagner's basic position quite well -- while there is "old" present in Paul, the "new" is so important that something different is created that is colored by what came before, not vice versa.
As already mentioned, Hagner presents his readers with traditional understandings of Paul in this essay. However, he does not do so without regard to new developments in the study of Paul and Judaism or the repugnant history of violence against Jews, especially in the twentieth century. As important as these two things are (and they are very important indeed!), Hagner does not allow them to control his reading of Paul. Instead, he attempts to read Paul faithfully while softening some of previous scholarship's rough edges where needed. In my estimation, Hagner's essay is convincing and even-handed.
I was left wanting in a specific area; I wish there had been more interaction with the texts of Second-Temple Judaism. Hagner is not to blame here, however, since this sort of essay cannot possibly cover all the bases. There are several places where the reader is left wanting to actually read what Jews of this period thought about these various issues. But again, this perceived deficiency in Hagner's essay has more to do with its scope than with its actual content, as the subtitle of the essay makes clear -- "According to Paul's Letters." In almost every instance of this phenomenon, however, the reader is pointed to more complete treatments of the issues in other works by Hagner or others. Thus, while every "i" could not be dotted and "t" crossed in this one essay, Hagner responsibly gives the reader ample opportunity to discover more on his/her own.
In my opinion, the greatest strength of Hagner's essay is the large amount of material quoted from Paul's letters themselves. Perhaps this is not necessarily a strength of Hagner's essay but of the traditional reading of Paul in general. In the work of a New Perspectivist, there are often many terms and phrases which are not taken to mean what they plainly seem to mean (e.g., "my own righteousness" in Phil 3.9 not pointing to a righteousness that Paul at least had a part in obtaining, but instead to some sort of national righteousness). Thus, when one is reading Dunn, Wright, etc and has the New Testament in hand, it is often difficult to see how they have arrived at the positions for which they argue so strongly. In Hagner's essay, however, Paul is often allowed to speak in his own voice and his words are allowed to carry what appear to be their plain meanings.
Nanos on Hagner
Hagner on Nanos on Hagner
Thursday, April 12, 2007
The Impossible Yoke: Part VIII
This will be my last post in this series in which I have examined Timo Laato's portrayal of Second-Temple Judaism's anthropology in the book Paul and Judaism: An Anthropological Approach. Here I will interact with his summary (found on pages 72-75) and I will make a summary of my own. A note for the future: I will hopefully post more about the Philippians 3 passage as well as the Jewish literature surrounding the NT in the months to come, seeing that I am working on a project now regarding both of them.
Laato begins his summary by stating that soteriological free will is the "opinio communis" of the literature from the Second-Temple period, except for the documents from Qumran, which he categorizes as representing "an absolute fatalism" [he does note EP Sanders' hesitation with this distinction in the footnotes] (72). He continues by saying:
I can agree with Laato that the literature he examined stressed the free will of individuals. Where I cannot agree is that the literature did not state unequivocally that individuals had the "power to always do good." This is simply not the case. The same could be said about Laato's insistence on an individual's ability to be obedient to the law "to the very end." As I have intimated many times now, admitting free will does not make a positive anthropology by default. The support for Laato's claim is that otherwise God is on the hook for sin by not creating creation fully sufficient. This is a weak support at best and it certainly reveals that Laato is anachronistically reading the Calvinism/Arminianism debate into this literature.
That God granted free will to individuals, as the literature of Second-Temple Judaism almost unanimously avers, should be viewed as a gracious move on God's part. And the fact that an individual chooses death instead of life in no way falls back on God; that choice is the sole responsibility of the one that did the choosing. In other words, Laato's support for his complete-law-obedience claim is unfounded.
Laato then goes on to link the purity of the soul (found in the Babylonian Talmud [Berakhot 60b]) with free will, though this is not evident from the quotation he provides (which seems to be more about resurrection than anthropology) (73). He later claims that this idea of the purity of the soul is "a fundamental principle of rabbinicism and respectively of Judaism" (74), though no primary sources are cited. Instead Odeberg, on whom Laato heavily leans, is the only reference.
Laato continues by stating that sin may taint the soul's purity temporarily but will never make it "definitively corrupt" (74), again with only Odeberg cited. Laato also rightly indicates that "[w]hen a person acts lawlessly, the whole human being sits in judgment" (74).
He ends with two paragraphs about Second-Temple Judaism's reading of Genesis 3. "The fall into sin worked neither a total loss nor a partial limiting of the free will and respectively the purity of the soul," which can be seen in the fact that Adam and Eve are said to have the same capability of obeying God before and after eating from the tree of knowledge (74). "Human nature went through no delimitation of essence by sin" and thus "[t]he rebellion in Paradise serves as one (well typical) example of disobedience" (74-75).
Because of all of this, Laato claims that "[t]he gulf to the Pauline way of thinking...appears unbridgeable" (75). I cannot comment on this fully here, but I can say that when compared to the slanted and forced picture of Second-Temple Judaism that Laato has presented I have to agree. If we let these texts speak for themselves instead of reading later theological developments over them, then perhaps we can make more sense of these Jewish texts as well as those found in the Pauline corpus.
In my final analysis, Laato is guilty of the same thing as EP Sanders - namely, reading their presuppositions onto the texts. Both claim that the other side of the theological fence is not reading the texts faithfully, while they each are doing exactly that!
Thus, to wrap this series up, it does appear that free will was a major part of Second-Temple Judaism, but this fact does not equate to a positive anthropology. Perhaps one could say that the anthropology of the literature that we have examined is more positive than that of, say, Calvin, but that is not what Laato is claiming. Laato is claiming that the texts which we have looked at present us with a polar opposite view of human capability than that for which Paul argues. To fully evaluate this we would have to look more in depth at many Pauline texts, but I feel that we can say that Laato's reading of Second-Temple Judaism was not fully sympathetic.
The Impossible Yoke: Part I
The Impossible Yoke: Part II
The Impossible Yoke: Part III
The Impossible Yoke: Part IV
The Impossible Yoke: Part V
The Impossible Yoke: Part VI
The Impossible Yoke: Part VII
Laato begins his summary by stating that soteriological free will is the "opinio communis" of the literature from the Second-Temple period, except for the documents from Qumran, which he categorizes as representing "an absolute fatalism" [he does note EP Sanders' hesitation with this distinction in the footnotes] (72). He continues by saying:
On the basis of free will man has not only the capacity always to choose good instead of evil. He has also the power always to do good (cf. the earlier quotations). Apparently everyone has an inborn propensity, but no hereditary compulsion to disobedience. It is fully conceivable to the very end to be obedient to the law. Otherwise God would bear at least to some extent responsibility for sins committed, since he would have created creation deficient. In view of a painful conclusion such as that it is self-evident that the Jews generally hold fast to human power of decision in the area of soteriology (73; emphases original as well as the unnecessary gender-specific language).
I can agree with Laato that the literature he examined stressed the free will of individuals. Where I cannot agree is that the literature did not state unequivocally that individuals had the "power to always do good." This is simply not the case. The same could be said about Laato's insistence on an individual's ability to be obedient to the law "to the very end." As I have intimated many times now, admitting free will does not make a positive anthropology by default. The support for Laato's claim is that otherwise God is on the hook for sin by not creating creation fully sufficient. This is a weak support at best and it certainly reveals that Laato is anachronistically reading the Calvinism/Arminianism debate into this literature.
That God granted free will to individuals, as the literature of Second-Temple Judaism almost unanimously avers, should be viewed as a gracious move on God's part. And the fact that an individual chooses death instead of life in no way falls back on God; that choice is the sole responsibility of the one that did the choosing. In other words, Laato's support for his complete-law-obedience claim is unfounded.
Laato then goes on to link the purity of the soul (found in the Babylonian Talmud [Berakhot 60b]) with free will, though this is not evident from the quotation he provides (which seems to be more about resurrection than anthropology) (73). He later claims that this idea of the purity of the soul is "a fundamental principle of rabbinicism and respectively of Judaism" (74), though no primary sources are cited. Instead Odeberg, on whom Laato heavily leans, is the only reference.
Laato continues by stating that sin may taint the soul's purity temporarily but will never make it "definitively corrupt" (74), again with only Odeberg cited. Laato also rightly indicates that "[w]hen a person acts lawlessly, the whole human being sits in judgment" (74).
He ends with two paragraphs about Second-Temple Judaism's reading of Genesis 3. "The fall into sin worked neither a total loss nor a partial limiting of the free will and respectively the purity of the soul," which can be seen in the fact that Adam and Eve are said to have the same capability of obeying God before and after eating from the tree of knowledge (74). "Human nature went through no delimitation of essence by sin" and thus "[t]he rebellion in Paradise serves as one (well typical) example of disobedience" (74-75).
Because of all of this, Laato claims that "[t]he gulf to the Pauline way of thinking...appears unbridgeable" (75). I cannot comment on this fully here, but I can say that when compared to the slanted and forced picture of Second-Temple Judaism that Laato has presented I have to agree. If we let these texts speak for themselves instead of reading later theological developments over them, then perhaps we can make more sense of these Jewish texts as well as those found in the Pauline corpus.
In my final analysis, Laato is guilty of the same thing as EP Sanders - namely, reading their presuppositions onto the texts. Both claim that the other side of the theological fence is not reading the texts faithfully, while they each are doing exactly that!
Thus, to wrap this series up, it does appear that free will was a major part of Second-Temple Judaism, but this fact does not equate to a positive anthropology. Perhaps one could say that the anthropology of the literature that we have examined is more positive than that of, say, Calvin, but that is not what Laato is claiming. Laato is claiming that the texts which we have looked at present us with a polar opposite view of human capability than that for which Paul argues. To fully evaluate this we would have to look more in depth at many Pauline texts, but I feel that we can say that Laato's reading of Second-Temple Judaism was not fully sympathetic.
The Impossible Yoke: Part I
The Impossible Yoke: Part II
The Impossible Yoke: Part III
The Impossible Yoke: Part IV
The Impossible Yoke: Part V
The Impossible Yoke: Part VI
The Impossible Yoke: Part VII
Saturday, March 31, 2007
The Impossible Yoke: Part VII
This post continues my series dealing with Timo Laato's perception of Jewish anthropology around the NT period in Paul and Judaism: An Anthropological Approach (1995). This time we will focus on Laato's reading of Philo (25BC - AD40) and Josephus (born AD37/38). All of the information here from Laato's book can be found on pages 71-72.
Starting with Philo (Quod deus sit immutabilis 10, 45-50; though I will only quote this in part):
As Laato himself notes on page 71, Philo's ideas about human free will fit nicely with the rest of the literature we have surveyed. According to Philo, people have inside them the ability to reason out what is good and what is bad and should be praised for choosing the good and should be counted as guilty for choosing the bad. It seems to me that Philo's anthropology at this point is indifferent, not unlike most of what we have seen up to this point. One can choose good but one can also choose bad. The last part of the quote that Laato provides, in which Philo comments on Duet 30:15,19, may shed some light on this however:
Here Philo does take a legitimately positive turn. He seems to say that an incorruptible part of one's reason will (says Philo with confidence!) accept that which is reasonable (the good) and reject the opposite (the evil). This is unabashedly positive. Philo is not saying that everyone will choose the good, because some unreasonably ignore this inner judge, but he does seem to say that simply submitting passively to reason will lead one down the correct path.
Now we turn to Laato's reading of Josephus, whom he paraphrases as follows (drawing from De bello Iudaico 2:119-166; Antiquitates Iundicae 13:171-173, 18:11-25):
So according to Laato's understanding of Josephus (which seems sound by the way) he would say that the Essenes have a negative anthropology, while the Sadducees and Pharisees have varying positive views of anthropology. My complaint will sound familiar: the fatalism of the Essenes does seem to highlight the fact that humans do not contribute to their religious standing before God but the freedom of the will that is advocated by the Sadducees and Pharisees is not entirely positive because it does not assume that all will choose correctly (it "depends on the person himself").
What I have tried to highlight time and again in this series is that the doctrine of free will may be illustrative of one having a more positive anthropology than a fatalist, but it still does not make a clear and overt positive anthropology.
I will end this series with the next post in which I will critique Laato's conclusion to this matter and offer some of my summations.
The Impossible Yoke: Part I
The Impossible Yoke: Part II
The Impossible Yoke: Part III
The Impossible Yoke: Part IV
The Impossible Yoke: Part V
The Impossible Yoke: Part VI
The Impossible Yoke: Part VIII
Starting with Philo (Quod deus sit immutabilis 10, 45-50; though I will only quote this in part):
But man, possessed of a spontaneous and self-determined will, whose activities for the most part rest on deliberate choice, is with reason blamed for what he does wrong with intent, praised when he acts rightly of his own will...But the soul of man alone has received from God the faculty of voluntary movement, and in this way is made like to Him, and thus being liberated, as far as might be, from that hard and ruthless mistress, necessity, may justly be charged with guilt, in that it does not honor its Liberator. And therefore it will rightly pay the inexorable penalty which is meted to ungrateful freedmen...
As Laato himself notes on page 71, Philo's ideas about human free will fit nicely with the rest of the literature we have surveyed. According to Philo, people have inside them the ability to reason out what is good and what is bad and should be praised for choosing the good and should be counted as guilty for choosing the bad. It seems to me that Philo's anthropology at this point is indifferent, not unlike most of what we have seen up to this point. One can choose good but one can also choose bad. The last part of the quote that Laato provides, in which Philo comments on Duet 30:15,19, may shed some light on this however:
So then in this way He put before us both truths; first that men have been made with a knowledge both of good and evil, its opposite; secondly, that it is their duty to choose the better rather than the worse, because they have, as it were, within them an incorruptible judge in the reasoning faculty, which will accept all that right reason suggests and reject the promptings of the opposite.
Here Philo does take a legitimately positive turn. He seems to say that an incorruptible part of one's reason will (says Philo with confidence!) accept that which is reasonable (the good) and reject the opposite (the evil). This is unabashedly positive. Philo is not saying that everyone will choose the good, because some unreasonably ignore this inner judge, but he does seem to say that simply submitting passively to reason will lead one down the correct path.
Now we turn to Laato's reading of Josephus, whom he paraphrases as follows (drawing from De bello Iudaico 2:119-166; Antiquitates Iundicae 13:171-173, 18:11-25):
The Essenes refer all things (including the evil and the doing of evil) back to divine predestination. The Sadducees in contrast believe that good and evil originate in human free will alone. The Pharisees on the other hand do indeed ascribe all things to destiny and God. To do right or wrong depends on the person himself, although destiny play a part in any case.
So according to Laato's understanding of Josephus (which seems sound by the way) he would say that the Essenes have a negative anthropology, while the Sadducees and Pharisees have varying positive views of anthropology. My complaint will sound familiar: the fatalism of the Essenes does seem to highlight the fact that humans do not contribute to their religious standing before God but the freedom of the will that is advocated by the Sadducees and Pharisees is not entirely positive because it does not assume that all will choose correctly (it "depends on the person himself").
What I have tried to highlight time and again in this series is that the doctrine of free will may be illustrative of one having a more positive anthropology than a fatalist, but it still does not make a clear and overt positive anthropology.
I will end this series with the next post in which I will critique Laato's conclusion to this matter and offer some of my summations.
The Impossible Yoke: Part I
The Impossible Yoke: Part II
The Impossible Yoke: Part III
The Impossible Yoke: Part IV
The Impossible Yoke: Part V
The Impossible Yoke: Part VI
The Impossible Yoke: Part VIII
Monday, March 12, 2007
The Impossible Yoke: Part VI
This post continues my series dealing with Timo Laato's perception of Jewish anthropology around the NT period in Paul and Judaism: An Anthropological Approach (1995).
Up to this point, Laato has dealt with some Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphal texts which deal with human free will. Now he turns to the rabbinic material and he interacts mainly with Jacob Neusner here. Laato notes that Neusner believes that the Mishnah (the Oral Law which was codified around AD 200) "is based on free will" (Laato, 68-69).
Several proof-texts are laid out on pages 69-71:
Rabbi Aqiba says in Avot 3:15:
The Sifre on Deut 11:26 (par. 53) says:
The Mekhilta on Ex. 15:26 says:
In the Babylonian Talmud (Beahhot 33b) Rabbi Hanina (ca. AD 225) says:
These quotes and the analysis of Neusner lead Laato to say that "[a]ll told, free will is denied in no place in the rabbinic literature" (71).
A few things should be noted. 1) This material was generally codified during the late second century and beyond, though some remnants of earlier material may remain. This may explain the difference in outlook of the earlier Jewish writings that we have examined.
2) While these texts do seem to have a more positive outlook on the human ability to do what God demands, they still do not rule out the possibility of choosing the wrong way. In other words, a truly positive anthropology not only understands the human ability to choose but also the reasonable expectation that humans will be able to choose correctly. These texts simply do not not give that level of assurance.
Thus, up to this point it seems that Laato has made a good case that Judaism in the period around the NT held to free will. However, simply holding to free will does not make a positive anthropology.
Next (and last) Laato looks at the philosopher Philo and the historian Josephus.
The Impossible Yoke: Part I
The Impossible Yoke: Part II
The Impossible Yoke: Part III
The Impossible Yoke: Part IV
The Impossible Yoke: Part V
The Impossible Yoke: Part VII
The Impossible Yoke: Part VIII
Up to this point, Laato has dealt with some Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphal texts which deal with human free will. Now he turns to the rabbinic material and he interacts mainly with Jacob Neusner here. Laato notes that Neusner believes that the Mishnah (the Oral Law which was codified around AD 200) "is based on free will" (Laato, 68-69).
Several proof-texts are laid out on pages 69-71:
Rabbi Aqiba says in Avot 3:15:
Everything is foreseen; and free choice is given. In goodness the world is judged. And all is in accord with the abundance of deed[s].
The Sifre on Deut 11:26 (par. 53) says:
See, this day I set before you blessing and curse [...] (Dt. 11:26-30): Why is this passage stated? The reason is that, since it is said, "Life and death I have placed before you, a blessing and a curse" (Dt. 30:19), perhaps the Israelites might say, "Since the Omnipresent has placed before us two ways, the way of life and the way of death, let us go in whichever way we choose." Accordingly, Scripture says, "Choose life." (Dt. 30:19)
The Mekhilta on Ex. 15:26 says:
"...saying, If you will diligently hearken": In this connection sages have said, "If one has obeyed one commandment, he is given the opportunity to obey many commandments, as it is said [...], 'If you begin to hearken you will continue to hearken.' If one has forgotten one religious duty, he is made to forget many religious duties, for it is said, 'And it shall be, if you begin to forget that you will continue to forget' (Dt. 8:19)."
In the Babylonian Talmud (Beahhot 33b) Rabbi Hanina (ca. AD 225) says:
Everything is in the hands of heaven except fear of heaven. For it is said, "And now, Israel, what does the Lord, your God, require of you but to fear" (Deut. 10:12) [cf. BT Megilla 25a and Niddah 16b]
These quotes and the analysis of Neusner lead Laato to say that "[a]ll told, free will is denied in no place in the rabbinic literature" (71).
A few things should be noted. 1) This material was generally codified during the late second century and beyond, though some remnants of earlier material may remain. This may explain the difference in outlook of the earlier Jewish writings that we have examined.
2) While these texts do seem to have a more positive outlook on the human ability to do what God demands, they still do not rule out the possibility of choosing the wrong way. In other words, a truly positive anthropology not only understands the human ability to choose but also the reasonable expectation that humans will be able to choose correctly. These texts simply do not not give that level of assurance.
Thus, up to this point it seems that Laato has made a good case that Judaism in the period around the NT held to free will. However, simply holding to free will does not make a positive anthropology.
Next (and last) Laato looks at the philosopher Philo and the historian Josephus.
The Impossible Yoke: Part I
The Impossible Yoke: Part II
The Impossible Yoke: Part III
The Impossible Yoke: Part IV
The Impossible Yoke: Part V
The Impossible Yoke: Part VII
The Impossible Yoke: Part VIII
Sunday, March 04, 2007
The Impossible Yoke: Part V
This post is a continuation of my series of posts about the anthropology of second-Temple Judaism. So far I am simply evaluating the way in which Timo Laato has used texts in Paul and Judaism: An Anthropological Approach. The next two passages that Laato quotes on page 68 are from 2 Baruch (i.e., the Syriac Apocalypse of Baruch). He believes that both of these passages highlight a positive anthropology in the Judaism around the NT period.
The first is 2 Baruch 54:15,19 (from A.F.J. Klijn's translation in Charlesworth, OT Psuedepigrapha, [1:640]:
And the second is 2 Baruch 85:7 (1:651):
Klijn has dated 2 Baruch to around AD 100 (1:617) and has noted that, though most of the oldest manuscripts are in Syriac, it is likely that 2 Baruch also existed in Greek (we have a few pieces of manuscripts that exist in Greek) and probably Hebrew as well (1:616). One of the primary things highlighted by 2 Baruch is the way in which Judaism coped with the destruction brought on by the Romans in AD 70 (1:620). All of these things point to the fact that 2 Baruch is roughly contemporaneous with much of the NT writings, though Paul's letters are generally quite earlier. So, 2 Baruch may reveal first-century sentiment that can be helpful in understanding the NT.
Like we have already seen, simply admitting free will does not necessarily a positive anthropology make. The phrase "each of us has become our own Adam" reveals this. If someone has become his own Adam, then he can end up like Adam, being punished for his sin. This shows the negative side of freedom clearly.
Again, the picture is not as clear as Laato would like to tell us it is. At best, the literature we have surveyed thus far reveals that Judaism of the second-Temple period believes humans are able to choose to follow God or not, but that this freedom does not mean that they also have the wisdom to make the correct choice.
The Impossible Yoke: Part I
The Impossible Yoke: Part II
The Impossible Yoke: Part III
The Impossible Yoke: Part IV
The Impossible Yoke: Part VI
The Impossible Yoke: Part VII
The Impossible Yoke: Part VIII
The first is 2 Baruch 54:15,19 (from A.F.J. Klijn's translation in Charlesworth, OT Psuedepigrapha, [1:640]:
For, although Adam sinned first and has brought death upon all who were not in his own time, yet each of them who has been born from him has prepared for himself the coming torment. And further, each of them has chosen for himself the coming glory...Adam is, therefore, not the cause, except only for himself, but each of us has become our own Adam.
And the second is 2 Baruch 85:7 (1:651):
And these things which I have said earlier should be before your eyes always, since we are still in the spirit of the power of our liberty.
Klijn has dated 2 Baruch to around AD 100 (1:617) and has noted that, though most of the oldest manuscripts are in Syriac, it is likely that 2 Baruch also existed in Greek (we have a few pieces of manuscripts that exist in Greek) and probably Hebrew as well (1:616). One of the primary things highlighted by 2 Baruch is the way in which Judaism coped with the destruction brought on by the Romans in AD 70 (1:620). All of these things point to the fact that 2 Baruch is roughly contemporaneous with much of the NT writings, though Paul's letters are generally quite earlier. So, 2 Baruch may reveal first-century sentiment that can be helpful in understanding the NT.
Like we have already seen, simply admitting free will does not necessarily a positive anthropology make. The phrase "each of us has become our own Adam" reveals this. If someone has become his own Adam, then he can end up like Adam, being punished for his sin. This shows the negative side of freedom clearly.
Again, the picture is not as clear as Laato would like to tell us it is. At best, the literature we have surveyed thus far reveals that Judaism of the second-Temple period believes humans are able to choose to follow God or not, but that this freedom does not mean that they also have the wisdom to make the correct choice.
The Impossible Yoke: Part I
The Impossible Yoke: Part II
The Impossible Yoke: Part III
The Impossible Yoke: Part IV
The Impossible Yoke: Part VI
The Impossible Yoke: Part VII
The Impossible Yoke: Part VIII
Saturday, February 17, 2007
The Impossible Yoke: Part IV
The pseudepigraphon 4 Ezra is the book from which Laato harvests his next proof for a positive anthropology in the Judaism of the NT period. He cites 8:55-58a (I will utilize the translation by Bruce Metzger in Charsleworth's Old Testament Pseudepigrapha [1:544]):
The book of 4 Ezra was probably written c. AD 100 (certainly not much after AD 120, though the first two and last two chapters are likely Christian additions which can be dated to the mid- to late- third century), likely in Hebrew (or Aramaic), though it was translated into Greek, Latin, and many other languages at some point (1:519-20). The manuscripts that preserve 4 Ezra are in Latin, Syriac, Ethiopic, Arabic, Coptic (Sahidic), Georgian, and Greek (1:519). All of this evidences that 4 Ezra was somewhat popular in the early church and that it likely represents something of the Judaism during the first century.
This book is highly apocalyptic, having many similarities with the NT book Revelation (1:522), and the section from which our passage is taken (the third vision; 6:35-9:25) is a description of the final judgment and the fate of the righteous and the wicked (1:518). The immediate context of our passage is a conversation between God and Ezra in which Ezra is interceding on behalf of those who have done wicked things. He is hoping that God will relent in his punishment (8:45).
However, as our passage reveals, God will not relent (8:55). They deserve their punishment because they were granted freedom and freely chose not to follow God, i.e., they rejected the Law and God's ways (8:56). Their disdain for God is ultimately manifest in their sin of trampling on the righteous (remind anyone of the eighth-century Israelite prophets?; 8:57)).
Of what relevance is this passage to the anthropology of the Judaism in the NT period? Again, as we have seen in the previous three posts, freedom is granted and humans have the ability to choose God. This certainly seems positive; even though this passage is couched in judgmental language. Those who are wicked deserve to be punished because they freely chose not to follow God. This implies that some, like Ezra himself, will choose the correct path -- which is found by living by God's Law and his ways (8:56).
There is a negative side to the anthropology in 4 Ezra as well. I believe that the best proof of this is 8:3, where God responds to Ezra's plea to relent in punishing the wicked:
It is hard to imagine this as a positive view of human capability. Though humans may be free, if most of them choose incorrectly, then surely this reveals their inability to follow through with the demands of following God, up to and including the Law (8:56).
Thus, the picture that 4 Ezra paints of human ability is a bleak one. The positive side is that all are free to choose God, but the negative side is that the majority will not.
Not quite as clear cut as Laato would have us believe.
The Impossible Yoke: Part I
The Impossible Yoke: Part II
The Impossible Yoke: Part III
The Impossible Yoke: Part V
The Impossible Yoke: Part VI
The Impossible Yoke: Part VII
The Impossible Yoke: Part VIII
Therefore do not ask any more questions about the multitude of those who perish. For they also received freedom, but they despised the Most High, and were contemptuous of his Law, and forsook his ways. Moreover they have even trampled upon his righteous ones, and said in their hearts that there is no God...
The book of 4 Ezra was probably written c. AD 100 (certainly not much after AD 120, though the first two and last two chapters are likely Christian additions which can be dated to the mid- to late- third century), likely in Hebrew (or Aramaic), though it was translated into Greek, Latin, and many other languages at some point (1:519-20). The manuscripts that preserve 4 Ezra are in Latin, Syriac, Ethiopic, Arabic, Coptic (Sahidic), Georgian, and Greek (1:519). All of this evidences that 4 Ezra was somewhat popular in the early church and that it likely represents something of the Judaism during the first century.
This book is highly apocalyptic, having many similarities with the NT book Revelation (1:522), and the section from which our passage is taken (the third vision; 6:35-9:25) is a description of the final judgment and the fate of the righteous and the wicked (1:518). The immediate context of our passage is a conversation between God and Ezra in which Ezra is interceding on behalf of those who have done wicked things. He is hoping that God will relent in his punishment (8:45).
However, as our passage reveals, God will not relent (8:55). They deserve their punishment because they were granted freedom and freely chose not to follow God, i.e., they rejected the Law and God's ways (8:56). Their disdain for God is ultimately manifest in their sin of trampling on the righteous (remind anyone of the eighth-century Israelite prophets?; 8:57)).
Of what relevance is this passage to the anthropology of the Judaism in the NT period? Again, as we have seen in the previous three posts, freedom is granted and humans have the ability to choose God. This certainly seems positive; even though this passage is couched in judgmental language. Those who are wicked deserve to be punished because they freely chose not to follow God. This implies that some, like Ezra himself, will choose the correct path -- which is found by living by God's Law and his ways (8:56).
There is a negative side to the anthropology in 4 Ezra as well. I believe that the best proof of this is 8:3, where God responds to Ezra's plea to relent in punishing the wicked:
Many have been created, but few will be saved
It is hard to imagine this as a positive view of human capability. Though humans may be free, if most of them choose incorrectly, then surely this reveals their inability to follow through with the demands of following God, up to and including the Law (8:56).
Thus, the picture that 4 Ezra paints of human ability is a bleak one. The positive side is that all are free to choose God, but the negative side is that the majority will not.
Not quite as clear cut as Laato would have us believe.
The Impossible Yoke: Part I
The Impossible Yoke: Part II
The Impossible Yoke: Part III
The Impossible Yoke: Part V
The Impossible Yoke: Part VI
The Impossible Yoke: Part VII
The Impossible Yoke: Part VIII
Thursday, February 15, 2007
The Impossible Yoke: Part III
Getting back to my project, I am now going to examine the second quote from Second-Temple literature that Laato uses in Paul and Judaism: An Anthropological Approach to highlight the positive anthropology of NT-period Judaism.
He quotes from the Psalms of Solomon 9:4-5 (I will quote from the version prepared by R.B. Wright in Volume 2 of Charlesworth's The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha [2:660]; Pss. Sol. have a date from around 70-45 B.C. [R.B. Wright in Charlesworth, 2:641]):
At the first superficial inspection of this text, it clearly appears that humans choose to do right and wrong and that this ability to choose has eschatological ramifications (the right choices lead to life and the wrong choices lead to destruction).
The way that God is characterized in this passage as well should also be noted. He is clearly shown as righteous, which means that he has the proper credentials to be the judge of humanity. He is also seen as one who oversees humanity, which may sound positive ("I'm looking out for you!") but certainly has a judgmental feel, especially considering the content of 5b. Lastly, God judges according to the individual and the household, thus doing away with the idea that nowhere in Second-Temple Judaism was personalized judgment in view.
This passage could not be clearer in its portrayal of the human ability to choose between good and evil. If we continue reading beyond the place where Laato's quote stops, we can begin to see a fuller picture of the anthropology of this passage. Pss.Sol. 9:5-7 [Charlesworth, 2:660-61]:
The picture from this passage is that repentance is available and necessary for those that sin, furthering the positive anthropology here. Since humans are capable of repentance on their own, they are still the ones choosing life or destruction. Also, if humans decide not to repent, then the sins of humanity are not on God but on humanity because each human had every opportunity to repent and chose otherwise.
On the other hand, this passage does have a negative anthropological feel to it in one respect. It almost presupposes the need for repentance. However, characterizing this fact as "negative anthropology" is simply off-base. The anthropology here is more realistic, in that humans are presented as sinful beings, which is demonstrable in the life of anyone who is being honest. God does not leave sinful humans dangling above the fires of hell; instead he provides them a way to experience his goodness through repentance.
Continuing to the end of this psalm, Pss. Sol. 9:10-11 [Charlesworth, 2:661]:
Here the tension between grace and works is evident. The psalmist admits that God made a covenant with his ancestors. According to the caricature of Judaism presented by the New Perspective on Paul, one would expect Jews around the NT period to understand that membership in this covenant was a matter of birth, which then leads to national (even racial) pride and boasting. This passage reveals something different.
The psalmist says "we hope in you when we turn our souls to you." This "we" can only be his contemporaries who were Jews by birth (especially if we are convinced by the contention that these psalms have a pharisaic pedigree, which R.B. Wright seems to doubt, along with the Essene-origin theory [R.B. Wright in Charlesworth, 2:642].). The point that I am trying to make is that the psalmist is presenting us with the fact that Jews by birth must nevertheless turn their souls toward God in order to be part of the covenant and it is only through this turning toward God that his mercy will be shown to Israel forevermore.
Thus, while the grace of the covenantal election comes into the picture in this last passage, free will still plays a role in covenant membership. If covenant membership is predicated upon one's ability to turn his/her soul toward God, then this passage certainly leaves us with a feeling that its anthropology is unreservedly positive (humans have the ability to gain positive standing before God).
The Impossible Yoke: Part I
The Impossible Yoke: Part II
The Impossible Yoke: Part IV
The Impossible Yoke: Part V
The Impossible Yoke: Part VI
The Impossible Yoke: Part VII
The Impossible Yoke: Part VIII
He quotes from the Psalms of Solomon 9:4-5 (I will quote from the version prepared by R.B. Wright in Volume 2 of Charlesworth's The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha [2:660]; Pss. Sol. have a date from around 70-45 B.C. [R.B. Wright in Charlesworth, 2:641]):
Our works (are) in the choosing and power of our souls, to do right and wrong in the works of our hands, and in your righteousness you oversee human beings. The one who does what is right saves up life for himself with the Lord, and the one who does what is wrong causes his own life to be destroyed; for the Lord's righteous judgments are according to the individual and the household [Syr, according to every person and his house].
At the first superficial inspection of this text, it clearly appears that humans choose to do right and wrong and that this ability to choose has eschatological ramifications (the right choices lead to life and the wrong choices lead to destruction).
The way that God is characterized in this passage as well should also be noted. He is clearly shown as righteous, which means that he has the proper credentials to be the judge of humanity. He is also seen as one who oversees humanity, which may sound positive ("I'm looking out for you!") but certainly has a judgmental feel, especially considering the content of 5b. Lastly, God judges according to the individual and the household, thus doing away with the idea that nowhere in Second-Temple Judaism was personalized judgment in view.
This passage could not be clearer in its portrayal of the human ability to choose between good and evil. If we continue reading beyond the place where Laato's quote stops, we can begin to see a fuller picture of the anthropology of this passage. Pss.Sol. 9:5-7 [Charlesworth, 2:660-61]:
To whom will you be good, O God, except to those who call upon the Lord? He will cleanse from sins the soul in confessing, in restoring, so that for all these things the shame is on us, and (it shows) on our faces. And whose sins will he forgive except those who have sinned? You bless the righteous, and do not accuse them for what they sinned. And your goodness is upon those that sin, when they repent.
The picture from this passage is that repentance is available and necessary for those that sin, furthering the positive anthropology here. Since humans are capable of repentance on their own, they are still the ones choosing life or destruction. Also, if humans decide not to repent, then the sins of humanity are not on God but on humanity because each human had every opportunity to repent and chose otherwise.
On the other hand, this passage does have a negative anthropological feel to it in one respect. It almost presupposes the need for repentance. However, characterizing this fact as "negative anthropology" is simply off-base. The anthropology here is more realistic, in that humans are presented as sinful beings, which is demonstrable in the life of anyone who is being honest. God does not leave sinful humans dangling above the fires of hell; instead he provides them a way to experience his goodness through repentance.
Continuing to the end of this psalm, Pss. Sol. 9:10-11 [Charlesworth, 2:661]:
You made a covenant with our ancestors concerning us, and we hope in you when we turn our souls to you. May the mercy of the Lord be upon the house of Israel forevermore.
Here the tension between grace and works is evident. The psalmist admits that God made a covenant with his ancestors. According to the caricature of Judaism presented by the New Perspective on Paul, one would expect Jews around the NT period to understand that membership in this covenant was a matter of birth, which then leads to national (even racial) pride and boasting. This passage reveals something different.
The psalmist says "we hope in you when we turn our souls to you." This "we" can only be his contemporaries who were Jews by birth (especially if we are convinced by the contention that these psalms have a pharisaic pedigree, which R.B. Wright seems to doubt, along with the Essene-origin theory [R.B. Wright in Charlesworth, 2:642].). The point that I am trying to make is that the psalmist is presenting us with the fact that Jews by birth must nevertheless turn their souls toward God in order to be part of the covenant and it is only through this turning toward God that his mercy will be shown to Israel forevermore.
Thus, while the grace of the covenantal election comes into the picture in this last passage, free will still plays a role in covenant membership. If covenant membership is predicated upon one's ability to turn his/her soul toward God, then this passage certainly leaves us with a feeling that its anthropology is unreservedly positive (humans have the ability to gain positive standing before God).
The Impossible Yoke: Part I
The Impossible Yoke: Part II
The Impossible Yoke: Part IV
The Impossible Yoke: Part V
The Impossible Yoke: Part VI
The Impossible Yoke: Part VII
The Impossible Yoke: Part VIII
Wednesday, February 07, 2007
The Impossible Yoke: Part II
In a previous post I stated that I wanted to examine the idea of the (in)ability of Law-observance in Judaism near, chronologically, to the NT. To begin I want to examine some quotations taken from Timo Laato's book Paul and Judaism: An Anthropological Approach (1995). In section 4.1.1 he examines the notion of "human freedom" in Judaism, which is a key component in the discussion of the (in)ability of Law-observance.
On page 67 Laato quotes Sirach 15:11-20, which he dates to 200 BC. I will not reproduce the quote as it appears in the book since it is likely a translation from German into English of a translation. So, to excise one step, I will quote from The New Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocrypha (AP 105-06). Sirach 15:11-20:
The logic of these two verses is clear. God created humanity, God gave them the power to have free will, the free will can be used to fulfill the commandments (which is equivalent to acting faithfully), and this choice is solely the responsibility of the one choosing (it is identified as "your own choice"). Not only is the basic logic easily spotted, so are some underlying meanings.
This ability to choose is called a "power" that can be enacted. "Power" conjures up ideas of effectiveness and capability. If this "power" can be harnessed, then it seems possible that one could ably fulfill the Law. All the Jewish believer would have had to do was reach out, through the power of his/her will, and choose to do the commands faithfully.
Moreover, while it could be interpreted a bit more positively, Sirach 15:19 has a very negative ring to it. To paraphrase: God is keeping his eyes on believers and he knows every human action. It is hard to read this verse in any other way than the hallway monitor, who watches those who follow the rules and those who don't. Those who follow the rules don't get detention, those who don't do.
Chapter 15 leaves us with the impression that the book of Sirach teaches that humans have the God-given ability in their own beings to fulfill the Law, even completely. As Charles Talbert put it, this passage and others "focus exclusively on human freedom" (Reading John [1994], 181). However, if we give any credence to the idea that the book of Sirach has a basic coherence of thought from beginning to end, then chapter 33 leaves us with an unresolved tension (J.J. Collins, Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls [1997], 34). The specific reference that Collins has in mind seems to be Sirach 33:13, which reads as follows: "Like clay in the hand of the potter, to be molded as he pleases, so all are in the hand of their Maker, to be given whatever he decides." Collins sums up his ideas on the tension between Sirach 15 and 33 like this, "the exercise of human choice is conditioned by the inclination with which a person is fitted at creation" (34).
However, this tension exists partly because of the context of each of the passages. Chapter 15 seems to be, in part, a defense against theodicy, while chapter 33 is presenting the reader with a magnificent picture of God as creator, the one responsible for all that is, the one who even chooses the pathways of humanity. Despite the apparent thrusts of each section, the tension remains.
Thus, free will and predetermination are intermingled here, but chapter 15 teaches that the ultimate responsibility for sin is to found within the one who has chosen not to keep God's commandments. The strong emphasis on human freedom in chapter 15 necessitates that one lean more toward the free will of human beings and the ability to fulfill the Law, whether this freedom was given and empowered by God or not.
I will continue this series of posts later with a quotation from the Psalms of Solomon.
The Impossible Yoke: Part I
The Impossible Yoke: Part III
The Impossible Yoke: Part IV
The Impossible Yoke: Part V
The Impossible Yoke: Part VI
The Impossible Yoke: Part VII
The Impossible Yoke: Part VIII
On page 67 Laato quotes Sirach 15:11-20, which he dates to 200 BC. I will not reproduce the quote as it appears in the book since it is likely a translation from German into English of a translation. So, to excise one step, I will quote from The New Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocrypha (AP 105-06). Sirach 15:11-20:
11-Do not say, "It was the Lord's doing that I fell away"; for he does not do what he hates. 12-Do not say, "It was he who led me astray"; for he has no need of the sinful. 13-The Lord hates all abominations; such things are not loved by those who fear him. 14-It was he who created humankind in the beginning, and he left them in the power of their own free choice. 15-If you choose, you can keep the commandments, and to act faithfully is a matter of your own choice. 16-He has placed before you fire and water; stretch out your hand for whichever you choose. 17-Before each person are life and death, and whichever one chooses will be given. 18-For great is the wisdom of the Lord; he is mighty in power and sees everything; 19-his eyes are on those who fear him, and he knows every human action. 20-He has not commanded anyone to be wicked, and he has not given anyone permission to sin.This passage seems to be highlighting a few things that are important to our discussion.
- Humans have the ability to choose to keep the commandments, i.e., to choose between life and death.
- This ability to choose is a power given by God from the beginning of human history.
- Choosing to follow the commandments of God is the faithful choice, the satisfactory choice, the choice that expresses love toward God.
- God is effectively taken off the hook for the sinfulness of humanity because, though he knows all human action, he never commanded (much less forced) anyone to be wicked and to sin.
The logic of these two verses is clear. God created humanity, God gave them the power to have free will, the free will can be used to fulfill the commandments (which is equivalent to acting faithfully), and this choice is solely the responsibility of the one choosing (it is identified as "your own choice"). Not only is the basic logic easily spotted, so are some underlying meanings.
This ability to choose is called a "power" that can be enacted. "Power" conjures up ideas of effectiveness and capability. If this "power" can be harnessed, then it seems possible that one could ably fulfill the Law. All the Jewish believer would have had to do was reach out, through the power of his/her will, and choose to do the commands faithfully.
Moreover, while it could be interpreted a bit more positively, Sirach 15:19 has a very negative ring to it. To paraphrase: God is keeping his eyes on believers and he knows every human action. It is hard to read this verse in any other way than the hallway monitor, who watches those who follow the rules and those who don't. Those who follow the rules don't get detention, those who don't do.
Chapter 15 leaves us with the impression that the book of Sirach teaches that humans have the God-given ability in their own beings to fulfill the Law, even completely. As Charles Talbert put it, this passage and others "focus exclusively on human freedom" (Reading John [1994], 181). However, if we give any credence to the idea that the book of Sirach has a basic coherence of thought from beginning to end, then chapter 33 leaves us with an unresolved tension (J.J. Collins, Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls [1997], 34). The specific reference that Collins has in mind seems to be Sirach 33:13, which reads as follows: "Like clay in the hand of the potter, to be molded as he pleases, so all are in the hand of their Maker, to be given whatever he decides." Collins sums up his ideas on the tension between Sirach 15 and 33 like this, "the exercise of human choice is conditioned by the inclination with which a person is fitted at creation" (34).
However, this tension exists partly because of the context of each of the passages. Chapter 15 seems to be, in part, a defense against theodicy, while chapter 33 is presenting the reader with a magnificent picture of God as creator, the one responsible for all that is, the one who even chooses the pathways of humanity. Despite the apparent thrusts of each section, the tension remains.
Thus, free will and predetermination are intermingled here, but chapter 15 teaches that the ultimate responsibility for sin is to found within the one who has chosen not to keep God's commandments. The strong emphasis on human freedom in chapter 15 necessitates that one lean more toward the free will of human beings and the ability to fulfill the Law, whether this freedom was given and empowered by God or not.
I will continue this series of posts later with a quotation from the Psalms of Solomon.
The Impossible Yoke: Part I
The Impossible Yoke: Part III
The Impossible Yoke: Part IV
The Impossible Yoke: Part V
The Impossible Yoke: Part VI
The Impossible Yoke: Part VII
The Impossible Yoke: Part VIII
Friday, February 02, 2007
The Impossible Yoke: Part I
In recent discussions in my class on Paul and the Law we have considered whether or not first-century Jews (in part or in whole) thought of the Law as a burden that no one could bear. A passage that is important to this issue has to be Acts 15:1-11, specifically verse 10, which says: "Now therefore why do you put God to the test by placing upon the neck of the disciples a yoke which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" This is, of course, from Peter's speech in the so-called "Council at Jerusalem." The "you" refers to the apostles and elders in Jerusalem generally and to those who were formerly Pharisees specifically and the "disciples" refers to Gentiles who were following Jesus.
The first question worth investigating is what exactly is this yoke that is being placed on Gentiles? Is it circumcision only as 15:1 seems to indicate? Or is the more immediate context of Peter's speech to control this term; which would mean that the yoke indicated circumcision and the rest of the Law of Moses as well (15:5). The latter seems most convincing. Thus, Peter claims that the observance of the Law (including circumcision) is a yoke that neither he, his fellow Jewish-Christian brother, nor their ancestors could bear (15:10).
But was this the case in reality? There is other biblical support for the idea. Matthew 23:4 reveals Jesus talking to the crowds about the scribes and Pharisees. He says that they "tie up heavy burdens and lay them on men's shoulders." In Galatians 5:1 Paul contrasts the freedom believers have in Christ with what the Judaizers are trying to force on them, namely a yoke of slavery. Romans 7:7-25 could also be called upon here, but many say the testimony there "is expressed in terms of his now Christian backward look at his life before Christ" (Fee, Philippians, NICNT, 309n.20), which has sufficiently altered his judgment.
There is also support for the opposite, i.e., that the Law could be fulfilled. In Philippians 3:6 Paul claims that he was blameless when it comes to righteousness which is in the Law. This means that as far as his pre-Christian interpretation of the righteousness with regard to the Law was concerned, Paul had complete legal rectitude. He was (literally) faultless in his completion of the Law. There is a major issue to clear up however. In Romans 7 Paul appears to admit to coveting, which is against the Law. So how could he state in Philippians 3 that he was blameless in accordance to the Law? It should be remembered that the Law not only pointed out sin (as is clear in Romans 7) but that it provided a way for restitution...through sacrifice. So Paul is not claiming in Philippians 3:6 that he was sinless, only that as far as the Law was concerned he had insured that all his ducks were in a row. As Bruce says "To conform with the righteousness required by the law called for infinite painstaking, but (as Paul had proved) it was not impossible" (Philippians, NIBC, 110).
From a reading of the major commentaries, it also appears that except for a few examples (1QS and 4 Ezra, notably) the Jewish literature of the time presupposed the ability to fulfill the requirements of the Law. This is a particular subject that I hope to delve into with more zeal over the next few weeks and months. I will start by finishing a book called Paul and Judaism: An Anthropological Approach by Timo Laato. In the book he basically argues that Judaism's anthropology was quite optimistic and Paul's was pessimistic. Perhaps I will discover some more primary literature there which will shed light on this subject. If I do or if I don't, I will post my findings here!
The Impossible Yoke: Part II
The Impossible Yoke: Part III
The Impossible Yoke: Part IV
The Impossible Yoke: Part V
The Impossible Yoke: Part VI
The Impossible Yoke: Part VII
The Impossible Yoke: Part VIII
The first question worth investigating is what exactly is this yoke that is being placed on Gentiles? Is it circumcision only as 15:1 seems to indicate? Or is the more immediate context of Peter's speech to control this term; which would mean that the yoke indicated circumcision and the rest of the Law of Moses as well (15:5). The latter seems most convincing. Thus, Peter claims that the observance of the Law (including circumcision) is a yoke that neither he, his fellow Jewish-Christian brother, nor their ancestors could bear (15:10).
But was this the case in reality? There is other biblical support for the idea. Matthew 23:4 reveals Jesus talking to the crowds about the scribes and Pharisees. He says that they "tie up heavy burdens and lay them on men's shoulders." In Galatians 5:1 Paul contrasts the freedom believers have in Christ with what the Judaizers are trying to force on them, namely a yoke of slavery. Romans 7:7-25 could also be called upon here, but many say the testimony there "is expressed in terms of his now Christian backward look at his life before Christ" (Fee, Philippians, NICNT, 309n.20), which has sufficiently altered his judgment.
There is also support for the opposite, i.e., that the Law could be fulfilled. In Philippians 3:6 Paul claims that he was blameless when it comes to righteousness which is in the Law. This means that as far as his pre-Christian interpretation of the righteousness with regard to the Law was concerned, Paul had complete legal rectitude. He was (literally) faultless in his completion of the Law. There is a major issue to clear up however. In Romans 7 Paul appears to admit to coveting, which is against the Law. So how could he state in Philippians 3 that he was blameless in accordance to the Law? It should be remembered that the Law not only pointed out sin (as is clear in Romans 7) but that it provided a way for restitution...through sacrifice. So Paul is not claiming in Philippians 3:6 that he was sinless, only that as far as the Law was concerned he had insured that all his ducks were in a row. As Bruce says "To conform with the righteousness required by the law called for infinite painstaking, but (as Paul had proved) it was not impossible" (Philippians, NIBC, 110).
From a reading of the major commentaries, it also appears that except for a few examples (1QS and 4 Ezra, notably) the Jewish literature of the time presupposed the ability to fulfill the requirements of the Law. This is a particular subject that I hope to delve into with more zeal over the next few weeks and months. I will start by finishing a book called Paul and Judaism: An Anthropological Approach by Timo Laato. In the book he basically argues that Judaism's anthropology was quite optimistic and Paul's was pessimistic. Perhaps I will discover some more primary literature there which will shed light on this subject. If I do or if I don't, I will post my findings here!
The Impossible Yoke: Part II
The Impossible Yoke: Part III
The Impossible Yoke: Part IV
The Impossible Yoke: Part V
The Impossible Yoke: Part VI
The Impossible Yoke: Part VII
The Impossible Yoke: Part VIII
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